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Abstract
Questions of data residence have taken on new
significance in an era of cloud computing, when data
can reside in any location, and indeed can reside in
different locations at different times. Microsoft and
the Department of Justice are litigating over whether
or not Microsoft is obligated to turn over data that
does not reside in the US in response to a warrant
from a US court. The issues in the case have
significance beyond the individual case, and require
a comprehensive reexamination of data sovereignty
and territoriality. Moreover, this is a weak case, and
the Department of Justice should not pursue it further
for a variety of reasons.

1. Introduction.
The Federal Government and Microsoft are
litigating over the government’s attempt to force
Microsoft to disclose emails from an account whose
owner has allegedly violated US law. Although
much information in the warrant has been redacted in
the copies available online, it is clear that the case
involves narcotics smuggling1. On the surface, it
seems like an ideal test case to establish the
government’s right to access data from the Cloud,
wherever in the world the data are stored. The owner
of the email account, if he is indeed a large-scale
international drug dealer, is scarcely a figure that
anyone would want to protect. The emails may help
convict the drug dealer if he is guilty, and he is
certainly not a sympathetic figure. But the case
between Microsoft and the US Department of Justice
is not about protecting the drug smuggler. It is about
data protection and data privacy laws, and indeed
about due process and international law. It is about
furthering the development of a rational policy
1
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towards data sovereignty and data citizenship in the
cloud. Protecting international agreements is far
more important than providing access to these emails
without due process, especially since there are easy
ways to obtain the data legally. Furthering the
development of policy for data sovereignty is more
important than undermining it.2 This is quite simply
the wrong case at the wrong time.
The wrong case: The case is quite complex,
which is why it has been in the courts since 2013 [7].
The alleged drug dealer is an Irish citizen. Microsoft
has stored the emails on a server located in Ireland
for legitimate reasons relating to online
performance.3 Microsoft is arguing that a US warrant
does not, cannot, and indeed must not compel it to
reveal data that are not located in the US and that do
not belong to Microsoft but rather to a client [12].
Microsoft is likewise arguing that the US needs to
obtain an Irish warrant [12] to obtain data that reside
in Ireland. The US is arguing that they do not need to
do so, and that this is burdensome and time
consuming [11]. However, the Irish government has
repeatedly offered to issue a warrant allowing the US
to search Microsoft’s data in Ireland and has filed its
own amicus curiae brief in support of Microsoft’s
position [8].4 The US has chosen to delay the
2

The significance of resolving issues in data
sovereignty becomes clear when examining recent
decisions and their implications for US high tech
firms. The recent EU decision striking down the safe
harbor agreement between the EU and the US makes
it illegal to transfer data from the EU to the US,
threatening the business model of firms like Google
and Facebook, among others [19], in part because
there are no assurances that the US government
cannot access the data. The concern among US tech
firms is obvious [4].
3
Latency is reduced and overall response time is
improved if an account is hosted as near to the
account owner’s geographic location as practical.
4
The full text of more than a dozen amicus curiae
briefs can be found online at the following links, all
available at https://digitalconstitution.com/about-thecase/,
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prosecution of the case by two and a half years by
trying to force Microsoft to violate Irish sovereignty.
This should thoroughly discredit the government’s
argument concerning the need for speed. There is a
right way for the US to get the data it needs, and that
is to rely upon Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
(MLATs), whereby one government can request a
warrant from a second country for evidence that is
located in the second country. See, for example, the
text of the Second Circuit Court’s decision [13],
noting both the role of MLATs and the presence of
such an agreement between the US and Ireland.5 6
Computer and Data Science Experts’ Amicus Brief
(Filed December 15, 2014)
Amazon and Accenture’s Amicus Brief (Filed
December 15, 2014)
Apple’s Amicus Brief (Filed December 15, 2014)
AT&T, Rackspace, Computer & Communications
Industry Association, i2Coalition, and Application
Developer’s Alliance’s Amicus Brief (Filed
December 15, 2014)
Brennan Center for Justice, ACLU, The Constitution
Project and EFF’s Amicus Brief (Filed December 15,
2014)
BSA | The Software Alliance, Center for Democracy
and Technology, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.,
The National Association of Manufacturers, and ACT
| The App Association’s Amicus Brief (Filed
December 15, 2014)
Anthony J. Colangelo, International Law Scholar’s
Amicus Brief (Filed December 15, 2014)
ABC, CNN, Forbes, Fox News, National Public
Radio, The Guardian, The Washington Post and 23
other media groups’ Amicus Brief (Filed December
15, 2014)
Verizon, Cisco, HP, eBay, Salesforce.com and
Infor’s Amicus Brief (Filed December 15, 2014)
Digital Rights Ireland, Liberty and Open Rights
Group’s Amicus Brief (Filed December 15, 2014)
Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of European
Parliament’s Amicus Brief (Filed December 19,
2014)
Government of Ireland’s Amicus Brief (Filed
December 23, 2014)
5 That process is governed by a series of Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”) between the
United States and other countries, which allow
signatory states to request one another’s assistance
with ongoing criminal investigations, including
issuance and execution of search warrants. See U.S.
Dep’t of State, 7 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) §
962.1 (2013), available at
fam.state.gov/FAM/07FAM/07FAM0960.html.
6

The United States has entered into an MLAT with
all member states of the European Union,
including Ireland. See Agreement on Mutual Legal

Indeed, the Irish
At the wrong time: This is a complicated time
for data privacy. Wikileaks [18] and Edward
Snowden’s disclosures of activities at the CIA [10]
have made it clear the extent to which US
information companies like Facebook, Google,
Microsoft, and Apple have cooperated in the past
with US Federal investigations of US and foreign
citizens, and there is a general sense of concern
among American citizens about these systematic
privacy violations [16], and disapproval of
government surveillance even as part of counter
terrorism activities [5, 17]. The resulting backlash has
already made it difficult for the US to obtain the
cooperation it needs; consider, for example, Apple’s
refusal to cooperate with the FBI by unlocking the
iPhone belonging to the San Bernardino shooter [9].
If there is a sense that US agencies do not respect
international agreements and international privacy
laws it will be increasingly difficult to get
cooperation from foreign firms and foreign
governments.
As reported in the Wall Street Journal, The US
Government sees this as a simple case [15]:
The Justice Department, which is seeking the emails
as part of a drug-trafficking investigation, sees no
international conflict. Microsoft has control over the
data from the U.S., where the company is based, and
the company is subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts, the agency has argued in court and in legal
briefs. At a time when governments around the world
are cooperating and sharing data, this may initially
appear attractive.
The government sees this as a simple case
because it sees it as a straightforward application of
the 1986 Stored Communications Act, itself part of
the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) [3]. Legal scholars agree on the centrality of
the ECPA, but do not uniformly agree on the
government’s interpretation of the Act; see, for
example [7].
It is not a simple case. Courts have been
struggling for years on how to apply old laws to the
issues created by modern technology (see for
example [20]). This case is even more complex
because it involves international data sovereignty
issues. We will argue for a variety of reasons that
this is the wrong case, at the wrong time for the US
Department of Justice to use to establish its rights to
data in the cloud, regardless of where the data are
stored. Rather than strengthen governments’ ability
to access data in future cases, it may actually impede
it.

Assistance Between the European Union
and the United States of America, June 25, 2003,
T.I.A.S. No. 10‐201.1.
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We will not argue as lawyers, though we will
rely upon briefs filed in this case and legal
precedents. We will rather argue as technologists and
strategy professionals, that is, as informed laymen.
The structure of this short paper is as follows.
Section 2 will outline the case itself. Section 3
reviews the status of the case and the decisions that
have been reached to date. Section 4 reviews why we
believe the case should be decided in favor of
Microsoft, and section 5 explains why we believe that
the US Department of Justice should drop this case.
Section 6 provides our policy recommendations
regarding international requests for data in similar
criminal cases, and section 7 provides our
conclusions, our summary, and a terse review of our
recommendations for future action.
When we first wrote this paper for the
conference we were arguing that the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals should decide in favor of Microsoft
and against the Department of Justice. Moreover, we
were arguing that the Department of Justice should
withdraw the case, rather than risk having the Circuit
Court decide against them. The Circuit Court did
indeed decide in favor of Microsoft [24], agreeing on
limits to the applicability of the ECPA to modern
searches of the cloud [6]. We are now arguing that
the Department of Justice should accept this decision
and not seek cert, that is should not petition for a writ
of certiorari and should not seek to have the case
reviewed by the last remaining court of appeals, the
Supreme Court of the United States. Moreover, we
are now arguing that if the Department of Justice
does seek cert, the Supreme Court should reject the
petition and allow the Circuit Court’s ruling to stand.
The arguments involved in this case are vitally
important; indeed, they are too important to be
resolved using such a weak case as this one to
establish legal precedent.

Congress is meant to only apply within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, to protect against
international discord and preserve a stable
background. If Congress wanted to have
extraterritorial reach, it needed to clearly state that in
the legislation, and it has not done so in this case.7 8 9
Moreover, Congress has historically wanted to
maintain international norms: US laws should be
interpreted to avoid unreasonable interference with
the sovereign authority of other nations10 in order to
avoid "international discord" that "could result" from
"unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations".11.
Further, there is a presumption against
extraterritorial application for a warrant12 13 14 15. This
presumption historically applies to cases involving
the ECPA.16
The Federal Government’s argument has three
principal components. First, Justice Francis accepted
the argument that despite being called a warrant, the
SCA warrant is actually part warrant and part
subpoena [14]. An SCA warrant “is obtained like a
search warrant when an application is made to a
neutral magistrate who issues the order only upon a
showing of probable cause” but then “is executed like
a subpoena in that it is served on the ISP in
possession of the information and does not involve
government agents entering the premises of the ISP
to search its servers and seize the email account in
question”.
Secondly, the test for the production of
documents is control, not location17, and the US

2. The arguments in the case

9

The Department of Justice is seeking emails
from a Hotmail account, and has served Microsoft
with a search warrant demanding Microsoft produce
the relevant emails to the Department of Justice.
Microsoft has argued that since the data are not the
property of Microsoft but of an Irish citizen, and
since the data reside in Ireland, the warrant is not
valid and has sought to have the warrant vacated
[15]. Microsoft has sought to have the warrant
vacated, that is ruled invalid. Its attempts to do so
have been unsuccessful, and currently Microsoft is
being held in contempt of court for its refusal to
comply.
Microsoft’s legal arguments have three basic
components. First, Microsoft is arguing that there is
no reason to believe that the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 was written by
Congress to have extraterritorial reach. Legislation of

7

Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247
(2010).
8

EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1991).
We will cite legal authorities in line, in the format
that would be used in court documents and legal
journals.
10

Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A, 2004
WL 1300131 (2004).
11

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct.
1659 (2013),
12

United States v. Vilar, No. S3 05–CR–621(KMK),
(2007)
13

United States v. Usama Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d
189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
14

United States v. Aquino, No. 1:07cr428, (2008)

15

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
494 U.S. 259 (1990).
16

Zheng v. Yahoo! Inc.(2009) WL 4430297.

17

In Re Grand Jury Proceedings the Bank of Nova
Scotia.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v.
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government has gotten documents despite criminal
penalties under Swiss Law18,and enforced a grand
jury subpoena for records stored in a foreign
country.19
Finally, the MLAT process may be slow and
laborious, and certain countries don't have MLATs
with the US. The US should not therefore be
required to rely upon MLATs when it can obtain a
search warrant that allows it to access data held by a
US company, whether or not the evidence in question
is in the US, provided the US company can directly
access that evidence from the US.
Microsoft’s response has two components. First,
Microsoft asserts that it does not “own” the data, but
instead serves as a custodian for the data. It operates
the equivalent of a password protected digital
lockbox, and therefore fails the “possession, custody,
or control regardless of the location” test.20
Finally, the warrant served by the court on
Microsoft from the Magistrate Judge is a warrant in
every sense of the word. In that respect, the warrant
violates the Fourth Amendment because it does not
identify the place to be searched and thus does not
constitute a “reasonable” search. Microsoft asserts
that electronic text communication is analogous to
letters and telephone conversations. Like other forms
of communication, emails have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and with a regular warrant,
the US Government could not search every building
of Microsoft in order to search for evidence.21

3. Status of the case between Microsoft
and the Department of Justice to date
The Department of Justice has served Microsoft
with a search warrant requiring that it turn over
emails from a specific account, relevant to narcotics
and international shipping. Microsoft has sought to
have the warrant vacated, that is, dismissed as
invalid. Microsoft lost its initial suit to have the
warrant vacated in 2014, lost its initial appeal in
2015, and appealed the case to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in 2015. The Second Circuit issued
its decision in July 2016, finding in favor of
Microsoft. Microsoft’s interpretation of the victory
and of its significance are summarized in the blog
the Bank of Nova Scotia, Defendant-appellant, 740
F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984).
18

Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.
1983).
19

United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA, 584
F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
20

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 - Supreme
Court 2014
21

United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282 (6th
Cir. 2010)

written by their President and Chief Legal Officer
Brad Smith, immediately after the decision was
announced [21].

4. Factors that might argue for the
Department of Justice violating
territoriality
There are extraordinary conditions under which
the Department of Justice might indeed need to
violate territoriality and attempt to force a company
to provide data that resides in a foreign nation.
Arguing as a technologist and a “reasonable man22
each of us believes that the following can constitute
valid reasons for violating jurisdictions and territorial
restrictions.
• Hot pursuit — When authorities are in hot
pursuit of suspects, and there is a danger that
the suspects will escape or destroy evidence if
not apprehend. Police chasing robbery
suspects will now coordinate across
jurisdictions but will not routinely allow
suspects to escape if they succeed in crossing a
municipal, county, or state border. This
argument is based largely on the need for
speed.
• Clear and present danger — When authorities
believe that the evidence is needed
immediately to prevent a major catastrophe,
involving significant property damage or loss
of life. If authorities believe that coordinating
with appropriate counter-parties in separate
jurisdictions may result in a dangerous delay,
allowing suspects to commit further criminal
acts, taking actions that violate
extraterritoriality may be justified.
• Unresponsive or uncooperative foreign
counter-parties — When authorities believe
that evidence or suspects have been located in
foreign jurisdictions where cooperation will be
withheld, or where authorities believe that
their foreign counterparties will actively
participate sheltering fugitives or in the
destruction of evidence, violating territorial
boundaries may be justified.

22

See Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasonable_person, “In
law, a reasonable person (historically reasonable
man) or the man on the Clapham omnibus is a
hypothetical person of legal fiction whose is
ultimately an anthropomorphic representation of the
body care standards crafted by the courts and
communicated through case law and jury
instructions.” That is, we are attempting to examine
the case as reasonable individuals, not as legal
experts.
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Indeed, all three have historically been used to
ignore territorial boundaries in cases in the past.
• Hot pursuit — The doctrine of hot pursuit
allows competent authorities to pursue
suspects if there is a clear reason to believe
that they have committed an offense and if
there is a clear reason to believe that they will
escape if not pursued. The applicability of the
hot pursuit doctrine internationally is
extremely limited, and it applies in only two
areas. Its principal use is the pursuit of a
vessel that is believed to have committed an
offense within the territorial waters of a nation,
when that vessel has escaped into international
waters while being pursued by competent
authorities of the nation whose territorial
boundaries have been violated. The second
area of applicability is within the Schengen
Area of Europe, including 22 of the 26
member states of the European Union.
• Clear and present danger — The US chose to
send a special operations Seal Team after Bin
Laden without the delay that would have
resulted from attempting to cooperate with
Pakistani authorities. Bin Laden was
considered too dangerous to the US for him to
be allowed to remain at large and potentially
active.
• Unresponsive or uncooperative counterparties — The Israeli government’s abducting
Eichmann, who was sheltering in Argentina
can be viewed as ignoring the territorial rights
of a sovereign nation [1]. US actions against
Marc Rich when he was exploiting Swiss
banking secrecy laws can be viewed as a
similar but less dramatic example of the same
principle. There was also a danger that
attempting to coordinate with Pakistani
authorities when the US acted against Bin
Laden in Pakistan would have been impossible
because there was a clear danger that Bin
Laden would have been alerted and given time
to flee [2]. Interestingly, the analysis of these
cases after actions were completed suggests
that the use of the principle of
extraterritoriality can be contentious, even in
cases that may initially appear to be
unambiguously legal.
We believe that it is clear that none of the three
is relevant in this case.
• Hot pursuit — The case is two and a half
years old. The emails have been archived.
There is no time pressure that would justify
extraterritoriality. And it is hard to see how
international agreements on extraterritoriality
would support the position of the US
Department of Justice.

•

•

Clear and present danger — After two and a
half years presumably the suspect is in custody
somewhere. Presumably he is not going
anywhere or harming anyone, and presumably
he is no longer engaged in international drug
smuggling. And the US government must
agree that there is no immediate danger or they
would not have refused offers of cooperation
from the Irish government, which would have
allowed resolution of the cases months earlier.
Unresponsive or uncooperative counterparties — Far from being unresponsive or
uncooperative, the Irish authorities have
volunteered to provide a warrant that would
have allowed the Department of Justice to
access the relevant emails. These offers of
cooperation to date have all been refused by
the US Department of Justice, but surely one
cannot argue that the Irish authorities have
been unresponsive or uncooperative, or that
they have behaved in any way that would
justify violation of their territoriality.

5. Why this case should have been
decided in favor of Microsoft
We believe that the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals decided correctly when it ruled in favor of
Microsoft. The case brought by the Department of
Justice was not a strong one. Moreover, the interests
of numerous parties with an interest in the case were
best served by this decision. As we explore below,
these parties range from US citizens, US technology
companies, and customers of those companies, to the
US government itself.
The case brought by the Department of Justice
was not a strong one. The cases that the US
government uses, and upon which its arguments rely,
are old and did not involve electronic evidence.
Extending the FBI’s reach to electronic data
wherever in the world it resides as long as it is
administered by an American data services company
is too great a reach. It is unjustified. And it is
unnecessary. It is easy enough for US authorities to
request that the American data services company
archive data so that there is little or no danger of the
data being destroyed. After that, there is adequate
time for US authorities to rely upon MLATs, and to
request that a search warrant be issued in the
appropriate jurisdiction.
The interests of US citizens around the world
would be harmed if this case were decided in favor of
the US government. At present, corporations insist,
rightly, that foreign governments must obtain valid
search warrants issued in the jurisdiction in which
data resides before they can be forced to share data
on their customers with foreign governments. If this
case were decided in favor of the US and against
Microsoft, this would establish a precedent that
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would enable any foreign government to obtain any
data from any company that operated in that
country’s territory, regardless of where that data
resided. US citizens would no longer have any legal
protection against illegal search and seizure of their
data, using precedents established by the US
government. This could be extremely dangerous to
citizens traveling abroad, to nations with less
established legal protections than our own.
The interests of Microsoft customers around the
world would likewise be harmed if this case were
decided in favor of the US government. At present,
Microsoft insists, rightly, that any government must
obtain valid search warrants issued in the jurisdiction
in which data resides before they can be forced to
share data on their customers with foreign
governments. If this case were decided in favor of
the US and against Microsoft, this would establish a
precedent that would enable place any Microsoft
customer at risk of unreasonable search and seizure
of their data by the US, without the legal protections
offered by their home jurisdiction.
The interests of US corporations would also be
harmed if this case were decided in favor of the US
government. At present, US corporations insist,
rightly, that foreign governments must obtain valid
search warrants issued in the jurisdiction in which
data resides before they can be forced to share data
on their customers with foreign governments. If this
case were decided in favor of the US and against
Microsoft, this would establish a precedent that
would enable the US to obtain data belonging to any
customer of a US data services company, regardless
of the customer’s home jurisdiction, and regardless of
where in the world the data resided. Customers
would rationally seek and find alternative service
providers, damaging or even destroying one of the
US’s most innovative international market for
services. Not surprisingly, a large number of
technology and media companies have submitted
amicus curiae briefs in support of Microsoft’s
position [23].
Even the interests of the US Government would
be harmed by a decision against Microsoft.
Voluntary data sharing and cooperation among
government agencies is increasingly important, and
the US is increasingly arguing for the rule of law and
for coordination of activities among intelligence
services and cooperation in the global fight against
terrorism. If the US wants other countries to respect
laws and common practices around the world, it must
do so itself. If the US wants other countries to share
data and intelligence information with it, it must
respect data privacy laws of the nations with which it
is cooperating.

6. The US government should withdraw
this case rather than risk losing it
We argued in advance of the Second Circuit
Court’s ruling that the case was weak, and that the
US was likely to lose it. This was indeed shown to
be correct. This remains true now. The case remains
weak, and the US remains likely to lose should it
seek to pursue the case further by appealing to the US
Supreme Court.
Moreover, it is easy to imagine future situations
in which the Department of Justice truly might need
to force a corporation to perform a search abroad, for
example in a case involving data resident in a country
with which the US did not have an MLAT in place.
Losing this case would set a damaging precedent that
would make it more difficult for the US to argue
successfully for extraterritoriality in the future. Not
only is the government risking setting a damaging
precedent, it is doing so with a weak case, and with
case that it does not need to pursue; the Irish
Government has repeatedly offered to cooperate.

7. What we recommend as policy
There is a small set of actions that could easily
be taken by all technology services companies and
email providers. These actions would ensure that the
outcome of a case would not be determined by delay
caused by properly pursuing appropriate venues,
simply by preserving potentially relevant evidence
while warrants were pursued. Thus, no country
would ever need to argue that in the absence of rapid
search, including search of questionable legality,
necessary email evidence would be lost forever.
While this would not alter the need for speed in
counter-terrorism operations, it would essentially
nullify the arguments used by the Department of
Justice in this case. The Congress should pass
legislation that would make these actions mandatory
for all service providers operating in the United
States.
First, all email service providers around the
world should be required to maintain backups of all
email correspondence as soon as they receive a
suitable official notification of an investigation
anywhere in the world for which this email is
material evidence and an official request for
assistance in obtaining a valid search warrant. We
are aware that backups are usually available, but this
ensures that any email that was available at the time
of notification would always remain available at the
time the service provider received a valid warrant.
This does not require the service providers to respond
to a warrant from a foreign jurisdiction. It does
require the service provider to maintain and protect
archival data until such time as the case is resolved or
the relevant jurisdiction where the data resides has
issued a warrant. If such a valid warrant is issued,
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then and only then is the company is required to
provide the data covered by the warrant. An official
request would be from a state, provincial, or national
government, or from an organization such as Interpol.
Rows (1) and (2) of table 1 below summarize the
activities that would be required of all service
providers providing email services within the United
States, whether they are US-based corporations or
not.
We note that it could easily be impossible to
enforce this without international harmonization. A
service provider operating out of the mythical Duchy
of Grand Fenwick or the Republic of Illyria might
seek to gain competitive advantage by persuading
their governments not to require archiving of email
accounts. We therefore believe that international
harmonization would be critical here. Companies
that were not required to archive email when notified
of its relevance to litigation might enjoy a
competitive advantage. Companies that could be
forced to provide emails without a valid warrant
would likewise be at a competitive disadvantage.
While the US Congress cannot impose requirements
or operating policies on companies when they
provide email services outside the US, we believe
that rows (3) through (5) represent policies that the
US should seek to have implemented by trading
partners around the world.
We believe that all governments should rely
upon MLATs to obtain valid search warrants when
they seeks data maintained by email service
providers, regardless of the home country of the
service provider and regardless of the location of the
data requested.
However, no service provider offering services
within the United States should be able to evade their
legal obligations to respond to valid warrants relevant
to US investigations by locating their servers offshore. This would preclude both the obvious
possibility of locating their servers in countries with
which the US does not have MLATs, or the possibly
more contrived alternative of constructing artificial
islands not subject to any nation’s laws and not
responsive to any nation’s MLAT. Indeed, we
recommend that either of these actions should be
interpreted under US law as a deliberate attempt to
evade control over data when required for criminal
cases. These off-shore legal evasions should be
viewed as only slightly different from illegal offshore money laundering and other illegal financial
transactions. In these instances US courts should be
permitted to search data as if it were maintained in
the US, because its foreign location would have no
other explanation except to avoid reasonable search.
Obviously, the US can only impose these restrictions
on companies operating in the United States and
offering services within the US. However, for
obvious reasons, the US should encourage

international harmonization, so that all our trading
partners impose comparable restrictions on service
providers offering services within their borders. This
is described in rows (6) and (7) in the table below.
Regrettably, obvious loopholes exist.
Individuals with private email servers can agree
amongst themselves to perform no archiving and
retain no copies of messages. New email service
providers can locate in unregulated markets and offer
email services that retain no archives and thus are not
subject to search, even if offering such service were
to violate local laws and regulations. End-to-end
encryption is emerging as a problem for law
enforcement around the world. While most
encryption is in principle subject to decryption with
sufficient time and sufficient resources, most criminal
investigations do not justify unlimited expenditure on
decryption, and in the case of terrorist threats there is
generally insufficient time for brute-force decryption.
Country
Where
Court
Located

Country
Where
Data
Stored

Relevant
MLAT
in Force

Warrant
that is
Required

US
(Country
of Court
and
Data)
Country
of Data
via
MLAT
US in
the
Absence
of
MLAT
Country
of Court
and Data
Country
of Data
via
MLAT

Note

(1)

US

US

——

US

Non-US

YES

US

Non-US

NO

NonUS

Same
Non-US

——

NonUS

Different
Non-US

YES

NonUS

US

YES

US

(6)

NO

Country
of Court
in the
Absence
of
MLAT

(7)

NonUS

US

(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)

Table 1.—Recommended policies for the applicability
of search warrants internationally.
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8. Conclusions: Summary and
Recommendations for Future Action
Our analysis supports the following assessment
of the case:
• The US Government can already obtain the
data it seeks; this litigation is unnecessary.
• The US Government’s arguments are weak or
even inapplicable in an online environment,
and if the case is ultimately decided in the
courts the US should lose.
• The US Government should withdraw this
case rather than risk losing it and risk setting
an unfortunate precedent.
The case is potentially harmful to the interests of
US citizens, Microsoft and other US service
providers, and even the US Government itself. If the
US Government were to win this case, despite the
weakness of its arguments, the interests of several
groups would be adversely affected.
• US citizens using any data service provider
anywhere in the world would be at risk of
unreasonable search and seizure of their
electronic communications as foreign
governments use this case as a precedent to
force cooperation with their own search
warrants. US Citizens’ protections would be
limited to those of any country that wanted any
data, rather than those available under US law.
• US Corporations including Microsoft would
be at risk of losing credibility with their
customers, since it would appear that the US
Government could search their electronic
records in foreign jurisdictions without
complying with the laws of those jurisdictions.
• Even the US Government, at a time when
voluntary data sharing and cooperation is
increasingly important, and the US is
increasingly arguing for the rule of law, may
find its own long-term interests harmed if it
were to appeal to the US Supreme Court and
then to win this case on appeal.
For these reasons as well, the US Government
should withdraw this case.
The US Congress should draft appropriate
legislation that would require US corporations to
maintain backup storage of critical electronic
communications involved in litigation, but should not
require them to turn over their records until they have
received a valid search warrant for the jurisdiction in
which the data resides. Moreover, existing mutual
legal assistance treaties should be extended so that
service providers in foreign jurisdictions obey
harmonized codes.
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